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ABSTRACT
This paper reveals that municipal police departmentsare much less
likely to strike in states that have collective bargaining laws than in
states with no police bargaining law or when police bargaining has been
outlawed. Unlike previous research which has used the stateas the unit
of observation, this study examine.s the municipal level decisionto strike
for a pooled cross—section of 2998 municipal police departments.
Pooled cross—section estimates of this study reveal twoimportant
relationships. First, municipalities in states that provide for collective
bargaining in any form experience significantly fewer police strikes than
do municipalities in environments where there is no lawor where police
bargaining is specifically outlawed. Second, among states with duty—to—
bargain rights for police, those with compulsory arbitration provisions
experience significantly fewer strikes. Fixed—effect estimates that consider
strike probabilities of the same cities under different statutesqualifies
the first finding. Municipalities that experienceda change from a "no
law" environment to a bargaining law environment are lesslikely to experience
strikes while in the "no law" environment than are municipalities which
have always been in no law environments. However, fixed—effectestimates
confirm the finding that a compulsory arbitration provisionsignificantly
reduces strike propensities. Interviews with representatives fromcities
that experienced a police strike suggest that stateagencies responsible
for the administration of arbitration mechanisms could help avoid strikes
by avoiding lengthy delays in the arbitration process after theexpiration
of contracts.
Casey Ichniowski
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 868—3912Strikes by public safety employees in thegovernment sector inter-
rupt vital services and may pose serious threts to life andproperty.
To avoid such interruptions, state policy makers haveenacted a wide range
of regulations for the process that determinescompensation and working
conditions. Strikes by government employees with fewexceptions are
illegal in allstatesand for all occupational categories. Suchregu-
lations do not eliminate public sectorstrikes, as strikes by government
employees have become more numerous over recentyears reaching a historical
high in 1978 with 481 strikes involving 193,700 workers. Otherstate
laws provide for different degrees of collectivebargaining rights for
public employees and for various dispute resolution mechanismssometimes
including compulsory binding arbitration.
How would one expect these variousstatutory provisions for bar-
gaining rights and impasse procedures to affect the incidence ofstrikes
by public employees? The institutional forces embodied instate bargaining
laws could influence work stoppages in severalways. Environments with
collective bargaining may experience more industrial conflictthan those
without statutory bargaining frameworks, withsome control for the level
of union activity in other sectors of theenvironment, since collective
bargaining formally institutes a process which may increase the inter-
action of labor and management representatives andthereby increase the
opportunity for bringing up issues that are difficult to resolve.
Conversely, despite increasing formal communication, a process
which increases the voice and participation of employeesmay tend to lessen
conflict by presenting opportunities for parties to workout issues with
a hrondcr perspective on possible solutions. Furthermore, byproviding
for unit certification procedures, collectivebargaining statutes could
reduce the likelihood of recognition strikes.
LI
The impact of these bargaining statutes and dispute resolution—L--
mecrianismshas been studied extensively in recent years. Manyof the studies
have focused on the impact of these statutory provisions oncompensation
of public employees with particular emphasis on theeffect of compulsory
arbitration.2' Yet, specifically for the case of arbitration statutes,
the intended effect of the statute is the avoidanceof work stoppages
by providing for a binding resolution to impassesin negotiations short
of a strike. No study has presented a comprehensive testof the impact
of bargaining statutes and of other factors on publicsector strikes.
This study seeks to fill this void by calculatingestimates of the impact
of different bargaining laws across the fifty states onstrike activity
for the occupation of police.
The effects of collective bargaining laws on strikeshave been
analyzed in rather misleading ways. For example,the Public Service
Research Council (PSRC) found that states that passedcollective bargaining
laws experience an increase in the number of public employeestrikes per
year after the passage of acollective bargaining law. This study does not
adequately address the existence of a similartime trend in strike activity
for states not passing bargaining laws, differencesin the number of muni—
cipaLitis across states, or differencesin strike activity or bargaining
provisions for different occupational groups;still these shortcomings
do not prevent the PSRC from concluding"that compulsory collective
bargaining in the public sector causes anincrease in strikes.. .and that
a method other than compulsory collectivebargaining for conducting employee—
employer relations in the public sectorwould be in the publicinterest."1
Academic research has also been constrained bydata availability,
the most widely cited study to date (Burtonand Krider, l975)' limited
to aggregate state level data for the years priorto 1971. Since then
other simple descriptive comparisons ofstrike frequencies across states
(Wheeler, 1975; Kochan,l979)' have been conducted. Yet much more sophis—tJcated research designs are needed to provide a definitiveassessment
of the effects of alternative laws on strikes6'Specifically, to achieve
such an assessment, the design should account for severalimportant con-
siderations. The design should allow for a comparison of strikeratios
across environments where no law exists, and where differenttypes of
impasse procedures exist. To the extent possible, this comparison should
go beyond a simple dichotomy such as law/no law or factfinding/arbitration.
The design should also consider differences in the number ofmunicipalities
and thereby obtain a better control over the number ofdepartments that
could go on strike. The design should control for othermunicipal and
state characteristics that could affect strike frequencies, while also
considering the specific details of bargaining statutes for different
occupational groups. Finally, one would want the design to maintain
valuable time series features and examine the samemunicipalities in
different statutory environments.
This study is able to examine the impact of differentbargaining
statutes on the municipal—level decision to strike by integrating all
occurrences of work stoppages for the years 1972, 1973, 1976, 1977 and
19/8bymunicipalpolicedepartments into a pooled cross—section time
series data set of 2,998 municipalities. Furthermore, byexamining thir-
teen states which legislated changes in the police bargaining statutes
in time1/2Lo 1978period, this study elaborates on pooled cross—section
estimates by examining thesamemunicipalities but in different statutory
environments. To provide a better understanding of the àauses ofpolice work
stoppages these two sets of empirical estimates are enhanced by inter-
views with union and municipal officials from the citiesexperiencing
wurk stoppages.
Pooled cross—section estimates of this study reveal two important
rHationships. First, municipalities in states that provide for collectivebargaining in any form experience significantly fewer policestrikes than
do municipalities in environments where there is no law or where police
4
bargaining is specifically outlawed. Second, among stateswith duty—to—
bargain rights for police, those with compulsory arbitration provisions
experience significantly fewer strikes. Fixed—effectestimates that
consider strike probabilities ot the same cities under different statutes
qualifies the first finding. Municipalities that experienced a change
from a "no law" environment to a bargaining law environment are less likely
to experience strikes while in the "no law" environment than aremuni-
cipalities which have always been in no law environments. Moreover,though
based on a limited number of observations, municipalities thatswitch from
a "no law" environment to a duty—to—bargain environmentwithout arbitration
are more likely to experience police strikes in the duty—to—bargainen-
vironment. However, fixed—effect estimates confirm the finding that, among
cities that switched from duty—to—bargain environments without binding
arbitration to environments with arbitration, the arbitration provision sig-
nificantly reduces the strike propensities of those cities.Interview
responses suggest that state agencies responsiblefor the administration
of arbitration mechanisms should try to avoid delays in thearbitration
process after the expiration of contractsin order to make this mechanism
as effective as possible in avoiding work stoppages.
Ilieremainderof this paper is divided into five sections. Section
U describes the municipal police data set. Section LII presentsthe models
used to estimate the hypothesized relationships. Section IV presentsthe
two sets of empirical estimates of determinantsof strike frequency: pooled
cross—section estimates and "fixed effect" estimates thatexamine the same
citiesin different environments. Section V presentsevidence gathered
about the cities experiencing strikes through interviewswith labor and




Work stoppages among the municipal police departments in the national
sample of cities are measured according to information collected by the
Industrial Relations Unit of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
BLS Form 3006 contains data on work stoppages by occupational category
and level of government. Information for all municipal level work stop-
pages involving police were collected for the years 1972, 1973, 1976, 1977
and 1978. These work stoppages are analyzed along three dimensions——frequency,
duration, and breadth. The frequency of strike activity is determined
by the existence of a work stoppage for a given municipality. The duration
of the stoppage is taken directly from BLS Form 3006, while breadth is
measured by man—days idle which is calculated as the product of duration
and the tijumber of uniformed police officers. The nature of the data col-
lection process by the BLS virtually assures that no police work stoppage
in any city in the national data set is overlooked.7'
2. State Bagining Laws
The major objective of this study is to gauge the impact that
different legal environments for collective bargaining have on the fre-
quency of police work stoppages. The variables constructed to measure the
leg;1environmenttake into accourLt two principal dimensions of these
laws——bargaining rights and impasse procedures. These bargaining environ-
ments have been defined by networks of state statutes, court opinions,
and opiilioris by state attorney generals.8'
The most important right granted employees in a state bargaining
environment is the duty—to—bargain. Under such a bargaining right not
only is the public employer required to bargain with representatives of—6—
employee organizations, but employees also have the right to form and join
an organization. Other state bargaining frameworks which permit bargaining
establish the legality of collective bargaining for covered employees.
However, under such frameworks employers are not obligated to participate
in the bargaining process. Other state frameworks establish the right
of employees or employee organizations to "meet and confer" with employers
or the right "to present proposals". In some state jurisdictions collective
bargaining for certain groups of public employees is explicitly illegal,
while in others the law is completely silent on the subject of public
employee bargaining rights.
In states where the duty of employers to bargain with employee
organizations has been established, impasse procedures for resolving bar-
gaining conflicts have generally been instituted. Dispute resolution
mechanisms in this sector generally are perceived in a hierarchical fashion:
mediation, factfinding, voluntary binding arbitration, and compulsory
arbitration. These third party processes have a tendency of becoming
more formal and judicial in nature the closer they come to compulsory
arbitration in the hierarchical setting.
in this study, four general classifications of collective bargaining
laws for police are considered. States with no specific provisions for
police cnl1ctive bargaining or states in which bargaining is explicitly illegal
form one category. In a second group are states which grant police labor orga—
nizations the right to present their views to employers regarding termsof em—
ploymeut, hut which fall short of a duty—to—bargain provision.In the third
category are states which have a duty—to—bargain provisionbut no compulsory
arhitrrttion mechanism for resolving disputes. Finally, the fourth group is corn—
posed of states which not only have duty—to—bargain laws,but which provide for
compulsory arbitration as well. A complete list of the statesand the categorization—1-P-
oftheir police bargaining laws according to this classification scheme
is given in the Appendix.
In formulating these four categories, a degree of subjectivity
was used in selecting the criteria to differentiate among the state bar-
gaining laws. States having no explicit law governing police collective
bargaining are grouped with states in which bargaining is illegal. This
is partly done in consideration of the historical development of state
bargaining laws. Until 1958, no state had a municipal employee bargaining
law and sentiment toward public employee bargaining, particularly for
public safety employees, was hostile. Viewed this way, the absence of a
specific state law is more correctly classified with laws specifically
outlawing police bargaining. A critical distinction between duty—to—bargain
and bargaining permitted provisions is that in the former class the choice
to bargain lies with the employee organization, while with the latter the
choice lies with the public employer. Compulsory binding arbitration within
a duty—to—bargain environment makes another significant change in the bar-
gaining process. In such an environment, police labor organizations need
not rely on the final consent of the public employer to determine the terms
and con(1iI ions of their employment, but rather a neutral third party has
power to arbitrate these contract terms.
Since this study involves all fifty states, some potentially impor-
tant differences among bargaining statutes within a given category may be
overlooked. Maine's police bargaining statute, for example, does provide
for a degree of binding arbitration; however, the arbitrator's decision
isonly radvisory in regardto salaries and wages".1 Because of the nature
ofsalaries andwages a a preeminent subject of bargaining, the Maine
statutewas classified withduty—to—bargain states having no compulsory
arbitration.Yet, the Mainestatute does possess an important feature
whichdifferentiates itfrom the other states within that category. Like——8—
wise, among arbitration statutes, differences between types ofarbitration
are overlooked; issue—by—issue arbitration, last—best offer arbitration,
and last—best offer package arbitration are all distinct versions of legis-
lated arbitration but are included wJthin the same category.
Moreover, differences in state laws regarding strike penalties
are not captured. The New York statute penalizes striking public employees
two—for—one in pay (the loss of a day's pay for not working and an additional
penalty of a day's pay for strikingillegally1), while Wisconsin fines
an employee ten dollars perday.1 Both these states are included in
the same hrbitration category. Penalties levied against police employee
organizations involved in a strike also vary within groups. Still, police
strikes (either by statutory language or court opinion) with rare exception
are treated as illegal. Despite these caveats, looking at all fiftystates
does have a significant advantage in that the entire spectrum of attitudes
toward police bargaining are considered by examining categories of reasonably
similar forms of state legislation.
3.Other Bargaining Status Variables
The collective bargaining status of a municipality with its police
departnent s measured by a dummy variable for the presenceof a written
labor contract. This variable is derived from responses to two questions
("does your city have a written labor contract covering wages, hours,and
conditiono 1)1 emplnymcnt for police personnel?" and "what year was the
first written labor contiact signed?") in a survey of municipal personnel
o1[ics by Freeman, Ichiiiowski, andLauer.12/ It is assumed that cities
responding affirmatively to the first question have continuallybeen party
to a po! fto contract since the date given in response tothe second question.13/
Th absence of a contract could be an additional factor thatcould cause
a strike, as minicipal police officers seek the"recognition" embodied in
a written agreement. This contract variablewill examine the possibility—9.-
that these -"recognition" strikes are relatively more frequent.
Also used in the analysis is a variable introduced in theFreeman,
Ichniowski, and Lauer study which measures the police bargaining environ-
ment in a state; that is the percentage of all municipalities in a state
with police labor agreements. This variable is derived from 985responses
obtained from the above contract status survey.'4' As hypothesized in
other research on bargaining statutes,' a high level of thispercent
contract variable may be the result of the passage of a bargaining statute.
Because of this possibility of collinearity and a causal relationship
between the law and percentage contract variable, strike frequencyequations
will be estimated with and without the latter variable, sincepart of an
eftect attributable to percent contract may, in fact, be indirectly attri-
butable to the passage of a bargaining law.
4. State—level Control Variables
Since the bargaining environment is defined along state boundaries,
it is important to control for other state—wide characteristics havingan
effect on strike outcomes so that the state bargaining law does not sub—
stflute for the effects of other factors. The collective bargaining variable
(perrent-ige of cities in a state with a written labor agreement with their
police departments) is one such variable. Other state characteristics
used as controls include four geographic region dummy variables (Northeast,
North (:cntral, South, and West),16' the percentage of a state's nongri—
cultural work force who are public employees, and the percentage of the
noungrtcultural work force that is unionized. The latter two controls will
indicate how favorable is the climate toward unions intitiating work stop-
pages. A'so, high levels of unionism should correspond to higher area
wic-'s ad may increase the expectations about a reasonable wage increase.
This would again lead one to expect a positive relation between these
state unionism varinbles and strike activity. Specifically, one wants a-lu-
negative coefficient on a bargaining law variable in a strike activity equation
to represent more a dampening effect of the law on work stoppages and less
the effect of other state influences which tend to discourage public sector
union activity or militancy.
5. Municipal Level Control Variables
Other explanatory variables included in this analysis are three
government type dummies (Council—Manager, Mayor—Council, and Commission),
a central city dummy, population, per capita income, total municipal revenue,
number of departmental employees, and maximum step salary forpatroimen.1'
Negative coefficients aie expected for the salary variable since
relatively low salaries should produce greater dissatisfaction among police
officers. In work stoppage equations, the effects of other municipal
level characteristics are less obvious in specifications which include
a police salary level control. For a given level of police compensation,
one might reasonably expect ability—to—pay measures to signal to police
employees unrealized potential wage gains; therefore, positive relationships
should be expected. However, one might expect negative coefficients on
these variables if wealthier communities can use revenues to avert strikes
in wvs other than by granting higher salaries, possibly through better
fringes not captured with the salary variable or by providing better equip—
mont or conditions. Central city status and population might also be
expected tohavepositive coefficients in strike equations with salary
controlled since police duties in urban or high population areas could
be more hazardous. Furthermore, for a municipality of a given population,
a larger department could signal a situation in which it isless likely
that aM enployee interests will be satisfied. In this case, one would
exrcc:tpositivecoefficients on department size. The government type
controls will investigate how differences in municipal government structure
afFect strike activity.III. Econometric Models
In order to identify the correlates of strike activityamong police,
S
themost appropriate unit of observation is the bargaining unit levelat
which the decision to strike occurs. Although multiplebargaining units
do exist within a police department, particularlydistinguishing superior
officers from patrolmen in large cities, this studyuses the municipal
police department as the unit of observation.
To identify the determinants of strike frequency a logit model
of the following form Is specified:
1
P (STRIKE.) = ÷
1l+e i
where P(STRIKE.) =theprobability of a police work stoppage occuring
in the.th
municipality
-* th and X. =avector of independent variables of the i
municipality
The logit specification overcomes the difficulty thatordinary least squares
regression would have for modeling the binary strike outcome, as the OLS
technique produces inefficient estimates and predictions, possibly out-
side the 0—I range by forcing a normal structure on the error term. Since
no a pori reason exists for preferring the normal cumulative density
function tothatofthe logistic cumulative density function, no attempt
to supplement logit with probit analysis is made. Oncecoefficients
are estimated, relative strike probabilities for an average city, differing
only on the bargaining law variable, will be calculated by evaluating the
logistic equation using the mean level of the control variables while
allowing thelawdummies to vary.
Since police strikes are extremely rare events, one would like
to extend the cross—section model given in the logistic equation by uti—
lizing the additional strike information across five years. A pooled-12
cross—section sample using 206 cities for 1972 and 1973 and 862 cities for
1976, 1977, and 1978 is constructed. For the 1972 and 1973 portionsof
the sample, 1973 levels of the control variables are used. For the 1976,
1977, and 1978 portions, 1978 levels of control variables areused.18/
For the salary control in 1972, 1976, and 1977, the salary levelwill be
a salary post—dating certain cities' strikes, so thatthe salary coefficient
in the strike equation may be distorted by potential impactsof strikes
on salaries in these years. For the bargaining statutes,variables will
reflect the actual environment in each of the five years.
Despite the weakness of pooled cross—section analysiscaused by
possibly inappropriate levels of certain independentvariables in some
years, it does have many advantages. It providesadditional data on rare
events. Furthermore, municipalities in any one year'scross—section may
not have equal conditional probabilities of striking inthat year along
the dimension of an omitted variable, a multi—year contract.If the multi—
year contracts that do exist do not expirein the same proportion across
the different bargaining environments in any given year and, as onewould
expect, the probability of a work stoppage isless during the term of a
contract coefficients on bargaining statute dummyvariables in a one
year cross—section equation will not accuratelyreflect the effect these
1a have on strikes. Municipalities not bargaining in one yearshould
bc engngl in bargaining during the time considered inthe pooled sample.
The issue which remains is that states with fewer writtenlabor
agreements (most commonly the no bargaininglaw states) may tend more often
toward an annual salary determination process. To the extentthat this
is truc, my positive coefficient on the no bargaininglaw variable should
bEakcn as a signal of the salary determination process occuring more
often. This should increase the number of opportunitiesfor police to-13-
become disgruntled over the setting of salaries. However, this influence
should not be viewed as reducing the validityofany law coefficients
obtained from this analysis. The degree to which the differentbargaining
laws move the parties away from an annual salary determinationprocess,
is measured by the degree to which this method of reducing industrial
conflict in this sector is promoted by different statutory bargaining
environments.
The pooled cross—section equations to be estimated make a sig-
nificant methodological improvement in the study of the impact of bar-
gaining laws on public sector strike activity by controlling for other
observable state and municipal characteristics that could affect strike
propensities. Still, there exist two very different explanations for
any correlations between bargaining laws and strike propensities detected
in the cross—section equations. One possibility is that the Institutional
forces embodied in the statutes affect how likely a police department is
to go on strike according to the arguments presented in the previous section.
Another very different possibility Is that the law—strike relation reflects
selectivity in the passage of bargaining statutes, with states passing
bargaining laws differing from those without laws in unobserved charac-
teristics. For example, a negative relation between strikes and environ-
ments with bargaining laws may be due to collective bargaining laws reducing
theproh-1)iI ity 01strikes.Conversely, states that enact bargaining
statutes may be composed of cities that had already been less likely to
strike, so that the negative coefficients would indicate a grouping of
states with cities that were less prone to strike prior to the enactment
of a law.(Parallel arguments can be made for arbitration—strike relation—
sli i ps)
By taking advantage of the longitudinal component of the law variables,
a fixed effect model disentangles the two possible causes for a law—strike-j_1
relationship.Fixed—effect logit equations cannot be estimated since the
maximum likelihood procedure will not converge for equations using cate-
gories for which there is no variance along tI'e dimension of the dependent
variable. Furthermore, the precise nature of the data set precludes
estimating a fixed effect model using an OLS "differencing from themean"
procedure. As described above, when municipalities are pooled across the
years 1976, 1977, and 1978, the 1978 levels for the controlvariables
(other than for the bargaining environment variables) are used. Since 1973
levels o! the control variables are available for a much smaller number
of cities, there will be no variation in the level of most independent
variables for a majority of the municipalities in the sample. Because the
"differencing from the mean" procedure is not well—suited to this data
set, itisnot possible to control completely for "omitted city—specific"
effects.
However, by extending the four bargaining statute dummy variables
to reflect information on changes in bargaining statutes, one can specifically
control for those omitted city—characteristics that are correlated with
the passage of bargaining laws by comparing the likelihood of striking
for the nrne municipalities but in different statutory environments.
Over the seven year period examined in this study, states experiencedthe
following changes: no law to bargaining permitted, to duty—to—bargainand
toarbitration.Of particular interest will be comparisons of the "no law"
cnefflcftnts for states that never experienced a change in law status to"no
law" coefficients for states that did experience a law change. Also, special
attention will be given to the comparisons between the before and after
environments of states that switched to arbitration mechanisms during the
period ccmsidered in this study. While the inclusionof this more detailed
set of law variables in an OLS regression does not controlfor omitted city—
specific effects as rigorously as a "differencing from themean" procedure,
i will allow for the examination of selectivity bias in the passageofbargaining laws. Moreover, by including a set of law variables that des-
cribes all possible law changes, the law variables are lessconstrained
l9/
than those used in a "differencing" procedure.
IV. Empirical Results
Table 1 presents a tabulation of strikes occurring under the dif-
ferent statutory bargaining environments. Forany of the five years,
strikes were most frequent in the "no law" category. Furthermore,across
all years, more strikes occurred in the no law category (60.5% of all
strikes) than all other categories combined. Only 5 strikes, or 6.2%
of all strikes took place in environments that provided forcompulsory
interest arbitration mechanisms. However, with the number of cities in
the pooled cross—section sample as a divisor, the strikepropensity
aning duty—to—bargain cities is of the same magnitude as it is among no
law cities. These proportions for arbitration and bargaining permitted
cities indicate much smaller strike propensities.
To investigate this pattern in more detail and to discover to
wliit extent certain bargaining statutes can be thought to reduce the like-
lihood ni police strikes, more rigorous statistical tests are appliedto
the daLa. Table 2 presents logit coefficients obtained fromestimating
pnoied cross—section equations in which a number of other characteristics
which cn1 afiect strike probabilities are controlled. The results
ar clearS—cut, never affected by the addition of the possibly confounding
pPr(cnt contract variable. Across both the earlier years (1972 and 1973)
and the later years (1976, 1977, and 1978), the point estimates indicate
that cities in environments which provide for some form of collective
bargriiiiio experience fewer strikes than cities in environments outlawing
hugatning or with no provision for bargaining. The consistent ranking
indicates that among these three types of bargaining environments, cities
in states with arbitration are least likely to experience strikes, and—16—
TABLE 1: POLICE STRIKES IN DIFFEREINT BARGAINING ENVIRONMENTS
FOR 1972, 1973, 1976, 1971, and 1978
(Strikes as a proportion of city—years given in parentheses)*
Type of Police Year
Bargaining Statue 19721973197619771978Total
1. arbitration 2 0 1 2 0 5
(.061)(0) (.004) (.007)(0) (.006)
2. duty—to—bargain 4 1 4 8 3 20
(.182) (.043) (.030)(.078)(.031) (.053)
3.bargaining per— 1 1 2 2 1 7
miLLed (.016) (.016) (.010) (.OlO)(.005)(.009)
4. no bargaining law 11 3 10 8 17 49














*City_years in the data set include 206 municipalitiesin 1972
and 1973, and 862 municipalities in 1976, 1977, and 1978.-17-
1AI1 2:LOGIIT COEFFICIENTS ANDSTANDARDERRORS FROM POOLED CROSS—SECTION
ESTIMATES OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF POLICE STRIKES WITH DIFFERENT BAR-
GAINING STATUTES
1972 —1978 1972 —1973 1976 —1978
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Observations 29982998 412 412 25862586
Mean of independent
variable .027 .027 .056 .056 .022 .022
1. Law \rarjahle
a. arbitration 2.6O***_2.73*** _2.16** —2.41* _3.31***_3.48***
(.59) (.61) (1.28) (1.58) (.81) (.81)
b. duty to —.24 —.31 —.58 —.70 _.59*_.70*
bargain (.37) (.39) (1.31)(1.35) (.41) (.43)
c. bargaining _l.42***_l.45*** _l.32* _1.38* _1.79***_l.78***
permitted (.47) (.47) (1.11) (1.13) (.57) (.57)
2. Percent —— .48 .62 .75
Contract (.70) (2.34) (.81)
Other control variables include two government type dummies, three region dummies
and up to four year dummies; population (and control for population less than
10,000); per capita income; total municipal revenue; department size; central city
dummy; percentage of nonagricultural work force that is unionized; percentage of
nonagriiitural work force that is in public employment; private maximum salary;
and a dummy for the presence of written labor contract.
—j 'nil cantat.01 level
igriificant at .05 ]evel
*— significantat .10 level—18—
"duty—to—bargain" cities most likely of the three. While the logit co-
efficients on the "duty—to—bargain" law variables are not significant
at conventional levels for the earlier years, all other law coefficients
are significant. To interpret these coefficients in terms of strike
probabilities the column 2 equation is estimated at the mean for all charac-
teristics while allowing the law dummies to vary. This estimation yields
strike probabilities of .0025, .0271, and .0089 for arbitration, duty—
to—bargain and bargaining permitted cities respectively. The estimate
for no law cities is .0367 thr from two to fifteen times greater than the
20 /
strikeprcbabilities for cities in states in the other law categories.
To understand the degree to which the negative relationship
between the passage of bargaining laws and strike activity is causal in
nature, the more detailed set of law variables that describe all changes
in statutory environments is introduced into the analysis. To what degree
is the increase in the absolute value of the negative law coefficients
from the 1972—1973 sample to the 1976—1978 sample in Table 1 the result
of the movement of less strike prone cities from no law environments into
the various bargaining law environments? The law dummies listed in the
left hind column of Table 3 differentiate cities that were always in no
1.-iw environments from cities in no law environments but that moved into
another statutory environment. With 862 cities in the later year cross—
sections, and twelve cities from the earlier year cross—sections that are
nnt contained among the 862 cities, there are 874 distinct municipalities
in this data set. Column 1 of Table 3 gives the number of these cities
in each category, while columns 2 and 3 give the number of strikes and
strikes asproportion of the 2998 city—year observations in each category.
Finn tIinproportions,several interesting observations can be made.
CLties in "no law" environments through 1978 (line 1) account for all no


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that eventually changed to a bargaining statute of some form(column 2 of
lines 2, 3, and 4), one observes no strikes in these cells.An examination
S
ofthese same cities in their later statutory environments (column3 of
lines 2, 3, and 4) indicate that these same cities did notexperience
strikes if the change was to bargaining permitted orarbitration environ-
ments. However, the cities described in line 3exhibit greater strike
propensities following a change to a duty—to—bargainenvironment. Columns
4 and5present coefficients from an OLS regression for the sample of cities
for which the initial year bargaining environment was nolaw. OLS point
estimates in column 4 indicate that no law cities that eventuallymoved
into bargaining law environments were less strike pronethan other no
law cities.In fact, the movement from no law to duty-to—bargain produces
a significant increase in strike activityfor the same cities. These results,
while based on a limited number of observations incertain cells, indicate
that part of the negative relationship observed in bargaininglaw coefficients
in Table 1, is the result of a "selectivity" scenarioin which states with
cities less prone to strikes under no law environments passbargaining
legislation.
\flenonemakesthe samesort of comparisons between duty—to—bargain
environments with and without compulsory arbitration one arrives at a very
different ronciusion. The proportions in Column 3 indicate strike propen—
sitics fr it ins in citity—to—bargain environments for all seven years of
.(H,(line7) and .007 for cities in environments with arbitration (line 9).
Trackingtheset of cities which moved from duty—to—bargain environments
without arbitration to environments with arbitration, one observes an
even greater reduction in strike probabilities (.084 in column 2 of line 8
aol .005incolumn3of line 8). The coefficients from the OLS regression
presented in columns 6 and 7 for the sample of city—years for which the
stntutory environcntwasarbitration by 1978 corroborate these results.
Arbitration coefficients, whether it is arbitration throughout the seven—21—
year periodor arbitration preceded by another environment, are all virtually
identical in magnitude. For this set of coeficients, the only coefficient
significantly different from zero is a significantly positive coefficient
for cities with duty—to--bargain preceding arbitration (line 8, column 6).
Results for the entire 2,998 sample using the complete set of detailed law
variables are given in columns 8 and 9 and consistently reflect the above
patterns.
While these results lend support to the argument that part of the
negative relationship for bargaining law coefficients discerned in the
cross—section estimates of Table 2 is due to states with less strike prone
cities passing bargaining laws, the impact of a compulsory arbitration
mechanism is unambiguous. Even among those cities moving from duty—to—
bargain environments without arbitration to environments with arbitration,
one observes a significant decrease in strike frequency consistent with
the earlier cross—section estimates. Compulsory arbitration provides an
effective dispute resolution mechanism to avoid strikes. However, a duty—
to—bargain provision without arbitration is in some ways a "half—way house"
which grants employees the right to bargain but is not necessarily coupled
with an effective means to settle contract disputes. The evidence suggests
thatstrikeactivity in states with a duty—to—bargain provision could be
reduced icnificantly providing for a compulsory arbitration mechanism.
V. Fe! ic Strikes —Evidencefrom Interviews
Thesampleof 81 strikes were also investigated separately. However,
quantitative estimates from equations which modeled strike duration as
a function of the array of independent variables yielded no significant
partial 'orrelatjons. This is consistent with the previous literature of
strkc activity which indicates that factors which explain one dimension
of strike activity well (frequency), do not generally provide much ex—
planatory power for other dimensions of strike activity (duration in days—'-
21/
or man—days). Part of the explanation for this is due to very little
variation in strike duration. Across all statutory environments, police
strikes are short. For the 81 strikes, the average duration was 6.1
days with 51% 3 days or less and 84% 9 days or less.
Still, important questions remain about these 81 strikes. Most
obvious is that despite the consistency of the finding that compulsory
arbitration mechanisms reduce strike frequency, five municipal police
departments in such environments did strike during the period considered
in this study. What differentiates these departments, and what problems
in the bargaining relationship could the arbitration provision not over-
come? To answer such questions interviews with labor and management
representatives from the five cities with arbitration strikes were con-
ducted. Also interviewed were representatives from the municipalities
which experienced police strikes in any state in 1978. Compensation and
working conditions were of course issues in the majority of these strikes;
however, the interviews were intended to find out why the various processes
available for arriving at the terms and conditions of employment could
not avert work stoppages.
ic)r the five police work stoppages in states with compulsory interest
nrbitration mechanisms, the most common reason cited by labor and manage—
mont representatives was the occurrence of lengthy delays in the dispute
resolution proccss and frustration over the length of time that had elapsed
since the expiration of t.he last contract. These delay related causes
wcrc cited for four of the five strikes. In one instance, a lack of con-
tinuity in the city's representative helped to cause the delay with the
city having seven city managers in the seven year period prior to thestrike.
Fwthcrmore, this department, operating without a successor contract, felt
the management was in no hurry to reach a settlement because of a state
1o mandating a 3% cap on interest on back pay awards. In another instance,2-•
TABLE4:INTERVIEW RESPONSES FROM REPRESENTATIVES FROM MUNICIPALITIES
EXPERIENCING POLICE STRIKES
Years Rep—s Reasons Cited for StrikeNumber times
resented Cited*
No alternative but to 5
strike in the absence
of any form of impasse
procedure
attempt to gain union 5
recognition in a written
contract




* Onlyreas(jn'ctp1 two ormoretimes are included in the table for arbitration and no
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(7) 1 0 1978
No law
(49) 17 14 1978—24—
thestrikeoccurred over the first contract ever negotiated under the state's
arbitration law, and the parties' lack of famliarity with the system
helped to cause delays. Related to the problems of delays in the arbitration
system are unclear communications between negotiators or within a negotiating
team. In one case, a police union representative said the department's
attorney had misinformed union officials of the city's most recent contract
offer and this helped to induce the strike. In the situation involving
the turnover of seven city managers, communications channels were further
confused by the practice of union officials of lobbying the members of
the city council to transmit their bargaining proposals to the city manager.
In two cases, additional problems were caused by the attempt to gain the
recognition of a written agreement for the first time. In one of these
cases, a department for a small town of about 3,000 people, negotiators
were unfamiliar with the workings of the arbitration mechanism. In the
other case, involving a city of approximately 39,000 people, management
refused to recognize the employees' right to make use of the arbitration
procedure, relying instead on the long—standing practice of deciding the
terms of employment unilaterally in meetings between the mayor and police
chief
For the other three statutory environments, representatives from
the21municipalities and their police departments which experienced strikes
in 1978 were contacted. Representatives of four of these 21 municipalities
would not respond to telephone or written inquiries, including three from
"noIaw"environments and the only1978 strike in a "bargaining permitted"
environment.
Forthe three duty—to—bargain strikes, one was a sympathy strike
for a firefighters work stoppage; another was a protest of the demotion
of a police chief who then joined the rank—and—file police on the picket
line.Thefinal strike was specifically aimed at obtaining a contractprovision providing for a local option to arbitrate future contract dis-
putes. While the department was successful in securing this contract
language, the local option to arbitrate contract disputes has not since
been employed.
For the fourteen "no law" strikes, six involved municipalities
without written contracts and eight with contracts. In five of the six
municipalities in which some form of bargaining had led in the past to
written agreements, police representatives cited the absence ofany pro-
cedures to address impasses as forcing the strike to bring additional
pressure to bear on the dispute. In five of the eight strikes in a no
contract situation, representatives cited the desire of the police to
obtain a written agreement as a major issue leading to the strike. The
final reason listed in this category in Table 4 is political tension.
While this factor is evident to some degree inmany strikes, in two cases,
it was given particular emphasis. In one case, the newlyappointed police
chief, a former marine corps general, was attempting to change department
procedures drastically, and a protest strike eventually occurred. In
another case, the police department's persistent difficulties with themayor,
who had a penchant for tearing up tentative agreements in front of the
employees' representative, was a major cause of the strike.
VI. Conclusion
The statutory bargaining environments under which police bargaining
is conduL ted have a significant impact on the likelihood that amunicipal
police department will be engaged in work stoppages. Simple cross—section
estimates indicated that fewer police strikes occur in states with some
statutory provision for bargaining. Fixed—effect estimates revealed that
this roIionship is due to greater strike propensities for municipalities
in sLates that never enacted a bargaining law. Cities in "no law" environ-
ments that did enact a bargaining statute were less likely to experience
;t:rikes than cities in no law environments that never enactedany such pro—visions. Furthermore, cities that did switch from no law environments to
duty—to—bargain environments without arbitration were significantlymore
likely to experience strikes after the enactment of the duty—to—bargain
law.
By providing for a compulsory binding arbitrationmechanism to
resolve disputes over negotiations of police contracts, statesreduce the
likelihood that their municipalities will experience police work stoppages.
ThIEresult isespecially clear in comparisons between duty—to--bargain
environm'ntswith and without arbitration provisions, and is borne out
in both the simple cross—section estimates and the estimates thatcontrol
forselectivity bias.Based onthe less rigorous testsin other research,
onecould reasonably extend thisfinding to the occupation of firefighters.
Milwaukeeand New York City, which is subject to a special city—level
lawand not the state law, provide the only examples where firefighters
have engaged in a work stoppage where a compulsory arbitrationlaw existed.22/
Questions remain to be answered. Precisely how costly arethese
interruptions in essential services caused by work stoppages bypublic
safety employees in terms of the threat to lives and property?What costs
are incurred in providing the administrativemechanisms for dispute reso—
lution ncjianisms? What are the incremental costs in providing artarbitration
mechanism where the dispute resolution procedures such as mediationand
frict firtcling already exist? It is clear that the sentimentof voters and
tax payr toward public employees is changing significantly.In a 1980
public referendum, Massachusetts voters followedthe lead set by taxpayers
in California in passing a "tax—cap" provision. Moreover,the language
of Massachusetts' Proposition 2 1/2 included a riderfor the repeal of its
compuloory arbitration mechanism for policeand firefighters——the first
si H 'Thniigo back from an environment witharbitration. It is clear that
legislative debate will be influenced by awide variety of economic and
political factors. Still, legislators shouldhave the benefit of the best
evidence possible concerning the impacts that public employee bargaininglegislation are likely to have on outcomes as important as the interruption
of ssential protective services. Finally, while some evidence exists
on the impact of the bargaining provisions on other outcomes such as corn—
pensation,231it would be instructive to calculate theimpact of such statu-
tory provisions on salaries, fringe benefits and work stoppages for the
same data set. In this way, one can see whether a dampening effect of
arbItration on strikes is obtained at the price ofhigher levels of corn—
pensation, or whether such a statutory provision is preferable over a
range of industrial relations outcomes. Research with this data set is
in progress to obtain such estimates.—28-
APPENDIX: STATE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING LAWS FOR POLICE
Year Arbitration
Year of Initial Extent of Bargaining Law Enacted
State Bargaining Law Right in 1978 (where applicable)
Alabama —— none
Alaska 1972 duty to bargain
Arizona 1974 bargaining permitted
Arkansas —— none
California 1961 bargaining permitted
Colorado —— none
Connecticut 1965 arbitration 1975
Delaware 1970 duty to bargain
Florida 1974 duty to bargain
Georgia —— none
Hawaii 1970 duty to bargain
Idaho —— none
Illinois 1961 bargaining permitted
Indiana 1975 duty to bargain
Iowa 1974 arbitration 1974
Kansas 1972 bargaining permitted
Kentucky —— none
Louisiana 1966 bargaining permitted
Mairre 1969 duty to bargain
Maryland 1977 duty to bargain
Massachusetts 1965 arbitration 1973
Michigan 1969 arbitration 1969
Minnesota 1971 arbitration 1971
Mississippi —— none
Missouri —— none
Montana 1973 duty to bargain
Nebraska 1967 arbitration 1967
Nevada 1967 arbitration 1969
NewPimpshire 1975 duty to bargain
N\]'ersey 1968 arbitration 1977
New Mexico 1966 bargaining permitted
New York 1967 arbitration 1974
North Carolina —— none
North Dakota 1961 bargaining permitted
O1ii —— none
Oll;honia 1971 duty to bargain
Oregon 1.971 arbitration 1978
Pennsylvania 1968 arbitration 1968
Rhode Island 1968 arbitration 1968
South Carolina —— none








Washington 1967 arbitration 1967
WestVirginia
—— none
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